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Abstract 
This paper investigates the feasibility of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) using a speed 
optimisation model to minimise the required freight rate, by employing current data from a 
shipowner,  by secondary data, conducting petroleum product transport on the NSR. The oil 
product tanker segment is used to assess route alternatives taking into account distance, ship 
size, ice breaking fees, fuel types and prices. Environmental policy elements are included in 
the cost analysis to account for low sulphur fuels from 2020, a prospective ban on the use of 
heavy fuel oil in the Arctic, and a possible global fuel tax. 
1. Introduction 
The Northeast Passage (NEP) is a maritime passage comprising of many routeing alternatives 
linking the Atlantic with the Pacific Ocean through the Russian Arctic coastline. The Northern 
Sea Route (NSR), which is part of NEP, is officially defined by Russia as the route stretching 
from Novaya Zemlya in the west to the Bering Strait in the east (Østreng and Eger, 2013)1. The 
recent focus on the NSR relates to the unprecedented reduction in the Arctic sea ice cover since 
1979 (e.g. Stroeve et al., 2012; Parkinson and Comiso, 2013; Stroeve and Notz, 2018). 
Currently, there is a growing body of literature within climate science projecting future 
accessibility of Arctic routes throughout the 21st century. The NSR is estimated to become 
accessible for non-ice class ships by 2050 (Smith and Stephenson, 2013; Melia et al., 2016). 
Whilst ice extent and thickness will remain the main obstacles for navigation between 2030 
and 2050, other ice and climatic conditions (e.g. ice ridging and pressure, waves, circulation, 
winds) will mainly affect shipping beyond 2050 (Aksenov et al., 2017). These developments 
have led to the re-emergence of the NSR as an alternative maritime route between Northwest 
Europe, Russian Arctic, North America and Northeast Asia.  
After the first experimental transit of a non-Russian flagged merchant ship (MT Uikku) through 
the NSR in 1995 (Brigham and Armstrong, 1996), exploratory transit voyages2 have increased 
since 2007 and peaked in 2013 with 2 and 71 transits respectively, followed by a rapid decline 
and use of the route mainly by Russian-flagged ships in 2014 (ARCTIS, 2013; NSRA, 2016; 
CHNL, 2019). Although the NSR offers shorter geographical distances up to around 60% 
depending on origin–destination (OD) (Mulherin, 1990), reductions in transport costs and 
transit times depend on a number of factors. Environmental factors (ice conditions, harsh 
climate), and safety concerns largely determine the use of the route. Moreover, geopolitical 
developments (re-direction of petroleum flows from the Barents and White Seas to the Baltic 
since 2014), decrease of piracy incidents in the Gulf of Aden during 2015, and most 
importantly, market conditions (drop in oil price levels during 2015, and variability of ice 
 
1 The term NSR is used hereinafter to denote either the NSR or the NEP for both transit and destination voyages. 
2 Transit voyages refer to voyages conducted between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans through the Arctic. Destination 
voyages originate or terminate within or outside the Arctic. Domestic voyages are those occurring within the boundaries of 
the NEP and/or NSR. 
breaking fees coupled with the provision of expensive ice damage repairs), all contributed to a 
rapid decline in transit traffic. 
Analysis of Arctic shipping feasibility has increased considerably since 2011 with liner 
shipping being the most studied transport system, and the NSR, the most studied route in the 
literature (Lasserre, 2014, 2015; Meng et al., 2016; Theocharis et al., 2018). On the other hand, 
less attention has been paid to bulk shipping, and more specifically on oil tanker segments 
(Song and Zhang, 2013; Zhang et al., 2016; Faury and Cariou, 2016). However, on average, 
49% of the exploratory transit voyages which occurred in the NSR between 2009 and 2014 
involved oil product tankers of various sizes, followed by a sharp decline to 10% between 2015 
and 2018. Although, this is attributed to a mix of economic and geopolitical factors, it shows 
that the potential of the NSR both for destination and transit traffic mainly lies with bulk (liquid 
and dry) and specialised (e.g. LNG) rather than liner shipping in the short to medium-term. The 
studies reporting on the feasibility of Arctic routes also confirm that they are currently more 
competitive for single or round voyages and for bulk shipping, whilst their competitiveness 
increases for year-round liner operations only in the long-term (Theocharis et al., 2018).  
This paper aims to examine the feasibility of the NSR against the oil product tanker segment 
at the tactical/operational level. First, the period 2011–20 7 is simulated to examine route 
choice between the Suez Canal route (SCR) and the NSR, then the current (2018) situation is 
investigated. Environmental policy implications from 2020 onwards are also assessed. The 
main factors considered are distance, fuel types and prices, ice breaking fees and ship size. The 
required freight rate (RFR) is used to compare the break-even cost per tonne of alternative 
routes from the shipowner’s perspective.  
A novel speed optimisation model is developed to minimise the RFR between the NSR and the 
SCR on a round voyage basis during the summer/autumn season. The speed constitutes a 
decision variable to the problem, contrary to other studies in which speed is an implicit input 
(Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2013). The model incorporates environmental policy elements 
reflecting a transition from high to low sulphur fuels from 2020 onwards to tackle air quality 
and enhance environmental protection as well as the potential to transition from heavy fuel oil 
(HFO) towards cleaner fuels by introducing a global fuel tax, and the ban on the use of HFO 
in the Arctic. The model employs up to date secondary data including vessel technical 
characteristics, capital and operating costs, and OD distances. Moreover, primary data 
concerning voyage-related costs and premiums were obtained from a product tanker 
shipowning company and a logistics company with extensive experience on the NSR.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: First, a literature review is provided in 
Section 2. The methodology is presented in Section 3, followed by the analysis of results in 
Section 4. The discussion of findings are provided in Section 5 and conclusions are drawn by 
reflecting on the results and future research opportunities.  
2. Literature review 
2.1. Feasibility of the NSR 
The feasibility of the NSR for deep-sea shipping is determined primarily by local sea ice 
conditions and the extent of the annual navigation season (Stephenson et al., 2014; Yumashev 
et al., 2017). Speed through ice is also an important factor that increases the uncertainty 
concerning transit times, and affecting voyage and operating costs alike (Wergeland, 1992; 
Mulherin et al., 1996; Kitagawa, 2001; Faury and Cariou, 2016; Pruyn, 2016). Cost factors, 
such as increased capital, fuel, and operating costs for different types of ice class ships (Erikstad 
and Ehlers, 2012; von Bock und Polach et al., 2015) and most importantly, ice breaking fees, 
largely affect the competitiveness of the NSR (Liu and Kronbak, 2010; Furuichi and Otsuka, 
2015; Cariou and Faury, 2015; Gritsenko and Kiiski, 2016; Zhao et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2018). 
Moreover, revenue factors, such as average load factor, deadweight (dwt) utilisation and ship 
size are crucial in order to exploit economies of scale (Wergeland, 1992; Schøyen and Bråthen, 
2011; Lasserre, 2014; 2015; Furuichi and Otsuka, 2015; Zhang et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2018). 
Yet difficult ice conditions, when they occur, may prevent larger ships using the route north of 
the New Siberian Islands, and therefore avoiding the shallow Sannikov Strait.  
Whilst the literature on comparative studies of Arctic routes has increased considerably since 
2011, so has the difficulty of identifying valid parameters regarding certain cost and operational 
factors (Lasserre, 2014, 2015; Meng et al., 2016; Theocharis et al., 2018). Minimal shipping 
activity on Arctic waters regarding full transits coupled with the complexity of Arctic maritime 
operations in harsh climate and sea ice, and the relatively small ice class fleet globally 
(Yumashev et al., 2017; Solakivi et al., 2017, 2018; Tseng and Cullinane, 2018), increase the 
variability of estimates and underline the difficulty of obtaining a global view on Arctic 
shipping economics. Solakivi et al. (2017, 2018) recently attempted to address this gap by 
statistically analysing and determining increased costs of ice class containerships, and bulkers 
and tankers respectively.  
Whilst the literature on the feasibility of the NSR has grown considerably during the last 
decade, there have been only a few studies investigating tanker trades (e.g. Song and Zhang, 
2013; Zhang et al., 2016; Faury and Cariou, 2016). Further, the extant literature investigates 
whether the NSR is a competitive alternative under specific conditions and certain periods of 
time. Whilst the impact of sea ice dynamics on the economics of the NSR has been explored 
(Faury and Cariou, 2016), there is a very limited understanding as to how fuel price levels, ice 
breaking fees and ship size affect the use of alternative routes in the context of oil tanker 
shipping (Zhang et al., 2016). Moreover, alternative fuel types and distances for oil product 
tankers have not so far been explored. Moreover, crucial economic factors which are coupled 
with inherent strategic and political issues encompassing the tanker trades and affect routeing 
patterns have not been addressed. This study aims to contribute to the literature by investigating 
the feasibility of the NSR for oil product tankers compared to the SCR by: 
• Demonstrating quantitatively why the NSR was a competitive alternative for product carriers 
during 2011–2014 and not since 2015. 
• Assessing the competitiveness of the NSR currently. Alternative fuel types and the 
forthcoming IMO 2020 sulphur limit are considered.  
• Quantifying the impact of environmental regulations by considering the introduction of a 
global fuel tax or a ban on heavy fuel oil (HFO) in the Arctic.  
• Considering distance by assessing three cases using indicative origins and destinations (ODs).  
• Considering the factor of ship size by using four ship sizes to take into account of economies 
of scale between alternative routes.  
• Developing a comprehensive speed optimisation model to determine the minimum RFR. The 
speed here is a decision variable to the problem rather than an implicit input, which is used to 
calculate other variables, such as the RFR (Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2013).  
• Employing up to date secondary data, and primary data concerning crucial factors that have 
not been considered in past studies. 
2.2. 2011–2017: From high to low fuel prices and insurance premiums 
The NSR witnessed an increase in transit voyages involving non-Russian flagged vessels 
during the period 2009–2013. There was extensive use of the passage, where the gradual sea 
ice retreat along with high fuel prices and a competitive ice breaking tariff policy induced non-
Russian operators to explore the NSR as an alternative to traditional routes such as the Suez 
and Panama Canal routes (Gritsenko and Kiiski, 2016). In addition, it boosted destination 
traffic. These developments also coincided with the launch of Russia’s new “Arctic Strategy 
2020” in 2009, concerning further development of the NSR (ARCTIS, 2019a, 2019b). Another 
equally important reason behind this surge in transit traffic was the increased number of piracy 
incidents off the Gulf of Aden during the period 2009–2014, which also meant additional 
insurance premiums when transiting via the SCR (Tanker Company, 2019). A large number of 
product carriers of 47 and 162,000 dwt operated along the NSR between 2011 (41.4%) and 
2014 (51%) (CHNL, 2019; NSRA, 2016). The sharp decline of product carriers’ voyages 
originating from the Barents and White Seas in 2014 is attributed to a redirection of condensate 
and naphtha flows to the Baltic (Bambulyak et al., 2015; Tanker Company, 2019). 
The decline of interest since 2015 is associated with the fall in global oil prices and a drop in 
piracy insurance premiums, which reduced the economic potential of the route, since both fuel 
cost and oil-related commodity prices declined respectively. Moreover, a lower RFR was not 
sufficient to cover potential ice damage repairs due to the remoteness of ports and low number 
of shipyards. Thus, the cost to repair ice damages can increase dramatically. Moreover, official 
ice breaking fees declined due to the depreciation of the rouble since 2015, but these were still 
higher than the discounted ones offered before 2013. The NSR being a shorter route lost its 
comparative advantage over the SCR for tanker voyages between the Atlantic and the Pacific. 
Not only did the cost differential between the NSR and SCR narrow due to lower voyage costs 
in the latter, but also low commodity prices and hence a lower value of cargo on-board meant 
that transit time was not very important. Fig. 1 shows the annual average prices of Rotterdam-
based HFO and marine gas oil (MGO) in US$ per tonne for the period 2008–2018, both 
correlated to the price of Brent crude oil, which is converted from barrels to metric tonnes. 
Following an almost 40% decline in the price of Brent crude between 2008 and 2009, HFO and 
MGO prices dropped by 25% and 42% respectively. Then, they rose during 2010, and 
maintained an average of 600 and 900 US$/t respectively between 2011 and 2014. 
Subsequently, HFO and MGO prices fell to an average of 260 and 450 US$/t respectively 
during the period 2015–2017. Currently (2018), the average prices for HFO and MGO are 
around 400 and 600 US$/t respectively (Clarksons, 2019). 
 
Sources: BP (2018), Clarksons (2019). 
Figure 1. Annual average price of a tonne of oil equivalent between 2008 and 2018 
2.3. Today to 2020 and beyond: towards alternative fuel types and operational modes 
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) extension of the limit on sulphur fuel content 
from the so-called Emissions Control Areas (ECAs)3 – currently at 0.10% – to a global level is 
expected to have a significant impact on fuel costs, types of fuel used as well as on capital 
expenses. More specifically, the global sulphur content in marine fuels (outside ECAs) must 
be reduced from the current maximum level of 3.50% to a 0.50% m/m (mass by mass) from 
2020 (IMO, 2018, 2016a). Currently, the options for the maritime transport industry to address 
these regulations extend from the adoption of abatement technologies to the use of alternative 
fuels. Abatement technologies may refer to exhaust cleaning systems (scrubbers) that are able 
to remove sulphur oxides (SOx) from the exhaust gas before these are emitted to the 
atmosphere. Alternative fuels relate to low sulphur heavy fuel oil (LSHFO) or distillates such 
as MGO, or other fuels such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), liquified petroleum gas (LPG), 
methanol, ethanol and biofuels. Whilst the global fleet may use the cheap heavy fuel oil (HFO) 
until 2020, it is expected that the share of MGO will increase between 2019 and 2020, and that 
the share of LSHFO will be preferred in the medium to long-term (IEA, 2018). On the other 
hand, the classic high sulphur HFO will still be in use post-2020 for those operators that will 
invest in scrubbers. In addition to IMO 2020 sulphur resolution, there have been discussions 
within IMO to extend the ban on HFO from the Antarctic to the Arctic, which is also 
recommended in the Polar Code (IMO, 2010, IBIA, 2018). These changes are expected, once 
again, to have an impact on routeing patterns, and therefore affect the use of certain canals and 
routes. 
3. Methodology 
The analysis in this paper consists of two parts. First, the periods 2011–2014 and 2015–2017 
are assessed to explain how fuel price levels, ice breaking fees and increased insurance 
premiums can affect route choice. Second, the current situation is investigated concerning fuel 
 
3 Currently, ECAs (SOx and Particulate Matter only) constitute the Baltic and the North Sea areas in Europe, and the North 
American and US Caribbean Sea areas in North America as well as the Hawaiian Islands are  (IMO, 2018). 
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prices, and lower piracy premiums compared to 2015. Alternative operational modes, such as 
investment on scrubbers to abide with the upcoming IMO 2020 sulphur fuel requirements, and 
the use of MGO as a potential alternative to HFO in the Arctic, are included in the analysis. 
Moreover, it is assumed as in Cariou and Faury (2015), and Lindstad and Eskeland (2015) that 
a fuel tax on HFO is imposed in the future. The comparison between SCR and NSR is based 
on a speed optimisation model, which minimises the RFR of a route alternative by using four 
product tanker sizes and three OD pairs as inputs. Subsequently, a sensitivity analysis is 
conducted to assess how fuel prices, ice breaking fees and reduced speed on ice affect the 
minimum RFR of both the SCR and NSR. 
3.1. Model 
The model developed in this paper is based on the optimal speed which determines the 
minimum unit cost on a US$ per tonne basis, that is, the equilibrium freight rate or required 
freight rate (RFR). Alderton (1981) distinguishes between the “least-cost speed” (LCS), which 
maximises profit on a per tonne basis and the “most profitable speed” (MRS), which maximises 
profit on a per day basis. The former optimises the speed where cost equals revenue i.e. the 
long-run equilibrium point between supply and demand whereas the latter considers the short-
term period where freight rates, port and waiting times fluctuate accordingly. The parameters 
and variables used in the model are presented in Table 1. 
The fuel consumption is expressed as a function of speed and displacement (Barrass, 2004; 
MAN Diesel and Turbo, 2013a; Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2013; Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2014; 
Adland et al., 2018; Jia et al., 2017): (��,∗ , ) = �, ∗ ( �,�∗�, �) ∗ �+�� /         (1) 
Where   is approximated at three for tankers (Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2013). A fuel 
consumption function of this form depends on speed and payload (Psaraftis and Kontovas, 
2013, Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2014). A fully laden and a ballast return voyage are considered, 
as is the normal practice in tanker markets, although triangulation through carrying backhaul 
cargoes is possible in oil products trades. The objective is to minimise the total RFR of a route 
alternative (either �  or ) per round voyage: �  � + ∗ �          (2) 
where  and �  denote the RFR of a round voyage (sum of laden and ballast voyages) 
for either ECA or non-ECA legs respectively. 
The RFR is a function of distance, optimal speed, total cost inputs and cargo carrying capacity 
of a particular vessel size for each leg and voyage: 
,� = �  [( �,��  �,�∗ ∗ ) ∗ ( (��,∗ ) ∗ � + ∗ ∗ (��,∗ ) ∗ ) + � + + � ∗ +� ]              (3) 
subject to  ≤ ��∗,  �∗ ≤            (4) 
Table 1. Parameters and variables used in the model 
Parameters: � average weight of a payload of oil products including fuel, fresh water, stores, 
ballast water, baggage and crew in metric tonnes (m.t.) �  average weight of cargo on board in metric tonnes (m.t.) , � ,  distance for ECA and non-ECA legs respectively, and total distance in nautical 
miles (n.m.)   �  fuel price in US$ per tonne (HFO outside ECAs or MGO inside ECAs) 
� operating cost in US$ per day  
 capital cost in US$ per day  
�  transit cost (canal tolls or ice breaking fees), insurance premiums, and ice 
damage repairs in US$ per round voyage 
 capital cost of exhaust cleaning systems (scrubber) in US$ per day 
 emissions factor of a particular fuel type 
 fuel tax in US$ per tonne  
�,   design speed for laden voyage and ballast voyage in knots 
  upper sailing speed  
  lower sailing speed 
�,  fuel consumption at design speed for laden voyage and ballast voyage �  Lightweight of a product tanker �  Displacement of a product tanker 
Variables: ��∗,  �∗  optimal speed for laden and ballast voyage respectively �∗ ,  ��∗  optimal speed for ECA and non-ECA legs respectively �∗  round voyage optimal speed �, , � Binary variables, equal to 1 when an ECA leg is included, and a fuel tax 
and/or scrubber are considered respectively, and 0 otherwise  , � ,   time for ECA and non-ECA legs respectively, and total transit time 
 
 
 
�, , � { , }            (5) 
The term � transforms  to  in US$ per tonne, whilst the term ( �,��  �,�∗ ∗ ) calculates the 
days at sea per round voyage for each leg. The variable � equals 1 when an ECA leg is included 
or 0 otherwise, such as in alternative operational modes or in OD pairs which do not involve 
ECAs. Variables � and  denote the use of a scrubber and the introduction of a fuel tax 
respectively, where �, = , when these are included in the model or �, =  otherwise.  The 
fuel tax is considered at 100 US$/t and the CO2 emissions factor for HFO is 3.114 (Cariou and 
Faury, 2015, Lindstad and Eskeland, 2015, IMO, 2015). The use of hybrid scrubbers is 
considered by using the assumptions of Lindstad et al. (2017). The lower and upper speed limits 
in this model are 5 and 16 knots respectively. The minimum speed on ice is defined as the 
speed in which a vessel cannot sail independently (MAN Diesel and Turbo, 2013b, Trafi, 
2017a, Solakivi et al., 2017), and the maximum assuming that the design speed is 90-95% of 
the maximum depending on ship size (Lindstad et al., 2011). Port dues and time as well as 
cargo handling, fuel cost in port and auxiliary fuel consumption are assumed the same when 
comparing alternative routes against the same ODs and hence are not taken into account in this 
model. 
By differentiating Eq. (3) with respect to speeds ��∗ and �∗  and set each partial derivative equal 
to zero respectively, that is, 
�� �∗  =  and �� �∗  = , with the values of ��∗ and  �∗  subject to 
lower and upper limits, i.e.  and , the  or unit cost per tonne is minimised and the solution 
gives the optimal speed for laden and ballast voyages, and for both ECA and non-ECA legs of 
the voyage respectively:  ��∗ =  √ �+ + ∗ ∗ ��∗ /( − ∗ �)∗(��+ ∗ �∗ )∗ �+� /   �  and �∗ =  √ �+ + ∗ ∗ ��∗ /( − ∗ �)∗(��+ ∗ �∗ )∗ �+� /  �          
(6), (7) 
This optimal speed, ��,∗ , depends on operating and capital costs (including those when a 
scrubber is installed on a vessel) as well as the price of fuel and fuel tax per tonne, payload and 
displacement. It does not depend on freight rates and distance, as is the case for a speed that 
maximises profit per day (Alderton, 1981, Ronen, 1982, Evans and Marlow, 1990). Besides, 
distance affects the economics of a route alternative through the RFR equation. It is also 
assumed that the optimal speed is not affected by charterparty obligations or any other 
constraints (Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2014, Cariou and Faury, 2015, Adland and Jia, 2018).  
The optimal round voyage speeds on ECA and non-ECA legs are calculated by using the 
harmonic mean of  ��∗ and �∗  for each leg as the special case of two numbers:  �∗ = ∗ �∗∗ �∗�∗+ �∗  and ��∗ = ∗ �∗∗ �∗�∗+ �∗                (8), (9) 
The optimal speed per round voyage is then determined by the total distance and time: = + �                        (10) 
where time within and outside ECAs is defined as follows: = ∗ ��∗ ∗  and � = ∗ ����∗ ∗                (11), (12) 
and the optimal speed is: �∗ = ∗ ��∗                      (13) 
The RFR differential between SCR and NSR is defined as: � =  −  �                    (14) 
This speed model is consistent with Fagerholt et al., (2015) and Fagerholt and Psaraftis (2015), 
where two distinct voyage legs are defined, i.e. within and outside ECAs and two different 
optimal speeds exist on each leg due to different fuel types and prices, and the non-linear 
relationship between speed and fuel consumption. It should be noted that when the use of 
scrubber is assumed, this permits the use of HFO inside ECAs. Equally, the switch to distillates 
such as MGO to comply with IMO 2020 policy means that this fuel is used on all voyage legs.  
3.2. Assumptions and data 
3.2.1. Distances and routes 
The geographical implications on costs and economies of scale for alternative routes are 
investigated by assuming three OD pairs after considering real transits. The distance on the 
NSR refers to the deep-water high-latitude route north of the New Siberian Islands. The reason 
for this is that the route via Sannikov Strait – almost same nautical miles (n.m.) with the high 
latitude route – imposes draught restrictions (13m depth), which prevent large vessels utilising 
the NSR (Mulherin et al., 1996). The Bloomberg vessel movement platform was used to track 
all NSR voyages between 2011 and 2018. It was found that almost all product tanker voyages 
considered in this study used the high-latitude route (Bloomberg, 2019). Transit traffic data 
from CHNL also show that this route was used extensively in 2016–2018 (CHNL, 2019). Yet, 
there is a trade-off between bathymetry in the Sannikov Strait and difficult ice conditions on 
the high-latitude route (Stephenson et al., 2014). In addition, distances when operating in 
Emission Control Areas (ECAs) are included in Table 2. The choice of ODs is based on the 
frequency of ports used and oil products transported. Fig. 2 shows that most of the times 
condensate cargo was transported from the port of Vitino in the White Sea to ports in South 
Korea, whereas jet fuel and gas oil were mostly shipped from ports in South Korea to the 
Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) area. Naphtha was mainly shipped from either 
Mongstad in Norway or Ust-Luga in the Baltic to ports in Asia. Heavy fuel oil is not included 
in the analysis, since there was only one transit voyage involving at least a non-Russian port 
(NSRA, 2016; CHNL, 2019; Bloomberg, 2019). Using the NSR as the basis of comparison, 
Vitino-Daesan, being the shortest OD pair, was chosen as a representative short-haul, whereas 
the Yeosu-Rotterdam pair was chosen as a long-haul in terms of distance. The pair of 
Mongstad-Mizushima in between them is considered as a medium-haul. Fig. 3 illustrates the 
respective routeing alternatives, whilst port characteristics are presented in Appendix A. 
 
 
Table 2. OD pairs and distances 
Origin – Destination (OD) 
Distance (n.m.) 
Suez Canal 
(SCR)  
Northern Sea Route 
(NSR) 
Difference between 
NSR – SCR  
Yeosu – Rotterdam   
(Long-Haul) 
10,872     
(ECA: 413) 
7,276               
(ECA: 629) 
-33% 
Mongstad – Mizushima 
(Medium-Haul) 
11,605   
(ECA: 912) 
6,668                
(ECA: 84) 
-43% 
Vitino – Daesan 
(Short-Haul) 
12,943 6,487 -50% 
Source: Dataloy Distance Table. 
 
Fig. 2. Frequency of transit voyages and clean oil products for tankers between 47,000–162, 0 
dwt in 2011–2018. (CHNL, 2019; Bloomberg, 2019). 
 
Fig. 3. Route alternatives and OD pairs. (Authors, based on ANU, 2019). 
 
  
Table 3. Vessel characteristics and newbuilding prices 
Ship Size DWT 
(Tonnes)a 
Length 
Overall 
(m) a 
Draught 
(m) a 
Beam 
(m) a 
Design 
Speed 
(knots) a 
Fuel 
Consumption 
(tonnes/day 
HFO/MGO) 
b 
Max. 
Speed 
(knots) 
Tonnes per 
Centimetre 
Immersion 
(TPC)b 
Ballast 
Capacity 
(Tonnes) c 
Fuel Tank 
Capacity 
(tonnes of 
HFO/MGO) 
d 
Newbuilding 
price       
(M.US$)c 
LR3 – Suezmax 150,000 274 16.1 48 15 47.4/50.3 16 117.8 52,500 3,150/2,685 59.3 
LR2 – Aframax 115,000 250 15 44 15 41.4/44 16 97.2 41,400 2,415/2,058 50.5 
LR1 – Panamax 75,000 225 14.2 32.3 15 34.1/36.2 16 66 28,500 2,310/1,816 43.3 
MR – Handymax 50,000 183 12.4 32.2 15 29.1/30.9 16 51.4 21,000 1,616/1,377 34.9 
Based on representative vessel sizes and capacities of the global product and crude oil tanker fleet (aMAN Diesel and Turbo, 2013c, MAN Energy Solutions, 2018, bcalculations based on a and 
MAN Diesel and Turbo, 2013c, MAN Energy Solutions, 2019a, email communication with MAN Energy Solutions, 2019b, Barrass, 2005, IMO, 2016b, cClarksons, 2019, dClarksons, 2019, 
calculations based on Platts, 2017). 
 
  
3.2.2. Vessel characteristics and fixed costs 
Most of the voyages concerning vessels below 10,000 dwt and 10–24,000 dwt comprised of 
domestic traffic. In contrast, larger vessels, such as Medium Range (MR), Large Range 1, 2 
and even one Large Range 3 (LR1, LR2, LR3) were mainly employed for either transit or 
destination voyages in the period under consideration (CHNL, 2019)4. Therefore the sizes 
chosen in this study are MR, LR1, LR2 and LR3 oil product tankers. The choice of LR3 size 
was made to facilitate the analysis of economies of scale, although currently clean petroleum 
product (CPP) trades involing such sizes are limited, but they could be used in dirty products 
or crude trades as well. The ice class 1A (Arc4) is chosen for the comparison between ice and 
non ice class ships, as this currently represents the majority of the global ice class fleet (Trafi, 
2017b; Solakivi et al., 2018). Moreover, ships which transited the NSR from 2009 to 2018 were 
of 1A ice class in most of the cases (NSRA, 2016; CHNL, 2019). The technical characteristics, 
and capital and operating costs of these vessels are presented in Tables 3 and 4. The choice of 
tankers is based on global average sizes and characteristics of product tankers (MAN Diesel 
and Turbo, 2013a, 2013c; MAN Energy Solutions, 2018, 2019a, 2019b). Table 5 shows that 
these values are close to tanker sizes used in the NSR between 2011 and 2018.  
Product carriers usually do not utilise their maximum capacity partly due to the low density of 
some oil products and partly due to smaller than the vessel’s dwt parcel sizes (Stopford, 2009). 
Cargo sizes are presented in Table 5. These are based on average parcel sizes carried by ice 
class product tankers in 2011–2018 (CHNL, 2019). Capital costs refer to average newbuilding 
prices between 2011 and 20185, whilst operating costs to a daily average between 2014 and 
2017. It is assumed that capital costs and installed power of the main engine for ice class 1A 
vessels are increased by 30.4% and 30.8% respectively (Solakivi et al., 2018). A shipowner 
conducting several product carrier voyages on the NSR provided the following premiums: 
maximum insurance premium at US$ 50,000, cost for books and charts at US$ 20,000 per 
voyage, daily crew costs are increased by 10%, and the rate for ice piloting at US$ 1,000 per 
day plus a fixed amount of US$ 5,000 for travel expenses (Tanker Company, 2019). Additional 
insurance premiums for piracy and armed guards when steaming off the Gulf of Aden are 
approximated at US$ 60,000 in 2011–2014 and US$ 24,000 in 2015, whereas these are 
estimated at US$ 10,500 per round voyage currently (2018). Increased repairs due to ice 
damage, if these occur, are estimated at US$ 200,000 per voyage including the cost of repairs, 
around three days off hire, bunkers and tugs in China – Shanghai region. The premiums are 
valid regardless of vessel size (Tanker Company, 2019). Moreover, a lump sum of US$ 
190,000 owing to one-off ship to ship (STS) transfer operations for Suezmax/LR3 tankers is 
included when loading nearby the port of Vitino (Logistics Company, 2019)6. 
 
  
 
4 The terms MR, LR1, LR2 and LR3 are used to denote oil product tanker sizes, which are equivalent to Handymax, Panamax, 
Aframax and Suezmax respectively for crude oil tankers (ICS, 2014, Platts, 2015). 
5 Data for LR2 newbuilding prices are only available for 2013–18 (Clarksons, 2019). 
6 STS transfer operations occur in the Barents Sea and used to occur in the White Sea due to port depth and other restrictions 
(Bambulyak and Frantzen, 2005, Bambulyak et al., 2015). The LR3 tanker Vladimir Tikhonov was loaded in such a manner 
for its NSR voyage in 2011. 
Table 4. Operating and capital costs for non-ice class vessel (US$ per day) 
 MR LR1 LR2 LR3 
Operating Costs 7,676   8,101   7,864   9,175 
Capital Costs* 8,344 10,353 12,074 14,178 
(Sources: Operating Costs: Moore Stephens, Interest Rates: Fed of St. Louis).                                                   
*capital recovery factor of 12.5% (2011-2018 average of 12-month USD Libor + 3%) over 10 years payment. 
Table 5. Cargo sizes and draughts when loaded. 
Ship 
Size 
Tanker Size on 
NSR 
(DWT tonnes)a 
Cargo Size 
on NSR 
(tonnes)a 
Ship Size in this 
study  
(DWT tonnes)b 
Cargo Size in this 
study 
(tonnes) 
Draught when 
loaded 
(m)c 
LR3  162,362 120,843 150,000 120,000 14.2 
LR2  113,074 87,139 115,000 90,000 13 
LR1  73,828 60,662 75,000 60,000 12.5 
MR  47,327 35,943 50,000 35,000 10 
Sources: aNSRA (2016), CHNL (2019), bfrom Table 3, ccalculations based on TPC (Table 3). 
3.2.3. Speed on ice 
There exists high uncertainty regarding the operating speed on ice, which largely depends on 
sea ice thickness and concentration, and ice ridges amongst others (Löptien and Axell, 2014, 
Aksenov et al., 2017). Transit traffic data from the Northern Sea Route Authority (NSRA), the 
Centre for High North Logistics (CHNL), and ARCTIS Database were analysed to determine 
the speed on ice water during the summer/autumn navigation season. Of the transit years 
provided by these sources, speeds are reported only in 2012 and 2013 (ARCTIS, 2013; NSRA, 
2016; CHNL, 2019). Speed data concerning 2011 were compiled from various sources to 
complement those from NSRA, CHNL and ARCTIS Database. In addition, the Bloomberg 
vessel movement platform was used to obtain the actual speeds of these transits in 2011–2018 
summer/autumn seasons. Speeds obtained from Bloomberg were finally used in the analysis, 
as these are deemed as accurate and more detailed than those reported in the aforementioned 
sources (Bloomberg, 2019). The mean recorded speed of tankers in the range of MR-LR3 was 
10.5 knots with a minimum of 5.8 and a maximum of 14.4 knots between 2011 and 2018 
summer/autumn navigation seasons. Therefore, the average speed of 10.5 knots is used when 
a vessel operates on ice water. This average speed is close to speeds used by Wergeland (1992) 
and Mulherin et al. (1996) in their simulations, that is, 11.25 knots on average during the 
summer/autumn season. Moreover, studies, which modelled ship speed along the NSR based 
on ship speed-sea ice properties dependency, report values which are close to the real data. An 
average speed of 10 knots on the NSR (Kitagawa, 2001), with a minimum of 7.5 knots (von 
Boch und Polach et al., 2015) for LR2 tankers and a maximum of 13–14 knots during 
summer/autumn for vessels of LR1 size (Kitagawa, 2001, Faury and Cariou, 2016). 
3.2.4. Ice breaking assistance and transit fees 
Generally, an ice class 1A vessel is capable of sailing on first-year ice with a maximum 
thickness of 1.0m (MAN Diesel and Turbo, 2013b, Trafi, 2017a). Ice breaking assistance is not 
mandatory since 2012 and is solely determined on prevailing sea ice and climatic conditions 
on the NSR (Gritsenko and Kiiski, 2016). The long-term trend of sea ice extent and thickness 
in the Arctic exhibit anomalies of negative values (Parkinson and Comiso, 2013; Lindsay and 
Schweiger, 2015). However, there exists high inter-annual variability and uneven distribution 
of sea ice conditions in the Russian Arctic, especially in the Laptev, East-Siberian and eastern 
Kara Seas in the medium-term (Stephenson et al., 2014). In addition, ship operators may be 
advised to use ice breaking assistance due to safety and for marine insurance reasons 
(Sarrabezoles et al., 2016).  
For these reasons and although acknowledging the fact that unassisted transits may occur 
during favourable ice and climatic conditions as in 2015–2016 navigation seasons, ice breaking 
assistance is assumed when operating on the NSR. Discounted ice breaking fees are assumed 
to reflect practice during 2011–2014, whereas official fees are assumed from 2015 to 2018, 
following the introduction of new tariffs in 2014 (NSRA, 2014). The practice of negotiated 
tariffs is well documented in the literature (Lasserre, 2014, 2015; Gritsenko and Kiiski, 2016; 
Moe and Brigham, 2016) and is also confirmed by the industry (Falck, 2012; Tanker Company, 
2019; Logistics Company, 2019). Besides, tariff rates during 2011–2014 as well as the latest 
ones (since 2014) are based on maximum rates, implying that these are negotiable (ARCTIS, 
2019b; NSRA, 2014; Gritsenko and Kiiski, 2016; Moe and Brigham, 2016).  
The ice breaking fees depend on ice class of a ship, gross tonnage, number of escorting zones 
and period of navigation (summer/ autumn, winter/spring), and are determined by Russian 
rouble exchange rates (NSRA, 2014). The Suez Canal fees depend on the type of vessel, 
routeing direction, Suez Canal Net Tonnage (SCNT), whether the ship is laden or ballast, 
draught, beam and are determined by the specific drawing rights (SDR) rates. The average Suez 
Canal tolls and SDR/US$ rates during the 2011–2018 NSR summer/ autumn seasons were used 
to calculate the Suez Canal tolls (IMF, 2019, Leth Agencies, 2019a). An online calculator from 
Leth agencies was used to calculate additional costs, such as tugs, disbursements, mooring and 
pilotage (Leth Agencies, 2019b). The assumptions and calculations of ice breaking fees and 
Suez Canal tolls are reported in Appendix B. 
4. Analysis 
4.1. Simulating the periods 2011–2014 and 2015–2017 
4.1.1. Optimal ship speed and fuel prices 
Here, the analysis focuses on the periods 2011–20 4 and 2015–2017. The relationship between 
RFR and ship speed is illustrated in Fig. 4 by using the results of a LR1 tanker round voyage 
at the Yeosu-Rotterdam pair as an example. Similar results for other vessel sizes and ODs are 
reported in Appendix C. The left-hand side of Fig. 4 refers to the SCR and the right-hand side 
to the NSR. The vertical axis represents the minimum RFR in US$/t as a function of the optimal 
ship speed in knots (horizontal axis), with the solid curves in the graphs reflecting the period 
2011–2014 and the dashed curves that of 2015–2017. The figure shows that when HFO/MGO 
fuel prices dropped from 600/900 US$/t in 2011–2014 to 260/450 US$/t in 2015–20177, the 
minimum RFR decreased from 41.5 and 38 US$/t to 32.5 and 33.8 US$/t for the SCR and NSR 
respectively. The SCR-NSR RFR differential at both high and low fuel price levels is illustrated 
by a shift of the curves downwards to the left. The differential was positive during 2011–2014 
at 3.5 US$/t and negative during 2015–2017 at −1.3 US$/t, which shows that the NSR being a 
shorter route, is favoured at high fuel prices and discounted ice breaking fees. 
 
7 The analysis is based on average annual fuel prices in Rotterdam (Clarksons, 2019). It is assumed that HFO is used for the 
period 2011–2014 in both ECA and non-ECA legs and that MGO is used from 2015, after the implementation of the 0.1% 
sulphur limit for fuels within ECAs (IMO, 2018). 
The optimal speed gives the minimum RFR for each route, which is lower than that when a 
ship steams at design speed. The U-shaped curves demonstrate the trade-off between fixed and 
variable costs with any departure from the optimal speed being cost-wise inefficient, always 
subject to constraints. At speeds lower that the optimal one, fuel costs decrease non-linearly 
whereas capital and operating costs increase with additional days per round voyage and vice 
versa. The optimal speed increased from 12.6 and 11.6 knots in 2011-2014 to 15.7 and 13.5 
knots in 2015–2017 on the SCR and NSR respectively. This confirms that speed optimisation 
and slow steaming practices can be mainly adopted at a high fuel price environment, whereas 
ships operate close to design speed or even faster when fuel prices are very low. Another point 
is that optimal laden speeds are lower by 0.9-1.6 knots than optimal ballast speeds due to higher 
resistance and fuel consumption when a vessel is fully laden. The lower optimal speeds on 
NSR is the result of the effect of speed on ice at 10.5 knots regardless of the fuel price levels. 
     
 
Figure 4. Relationship between optimal speed and minimum RFR for LR1 Yeosu-Rotterdam 
at high (2011-2014) and low (2015-2017) fuel prices. 
4.1.2. Ship size, fuel prices and distance 
The relationship between minimum RFR and ship size across all OD pairs is depicted in Fig. 
5, with numerical results reported in Appendix C. Here, using the NSR as a basis of 
comparison, the Yeosu-Rotterdam pair is considered as a long-haul, whereas the Vitino-Daesan 
pair a short-haul, with the Mongstad-Mizushima pair in between these two being a medium-
haul. Distance savings increase gradually moving from the long to the short-haul when using 
the NSR between Northwest Europe/Baltic/Arctic to Northeast Asia. The results are based on 
the optimal speed, which minimises the RFR at a given OD and vessel size. As in Fig. 4, there 
is a distinction between 2011–2014 and 2015–2017 with a high and low fuel price environment 
reflected in solid and dashed curves for each route respectively. According to a shipowner with 
extensive experience in the NSR, operators factor in the cost of repairs when assessing 
alternatives to take into account the risk of severe ice damages to the hull of a ship (Tanker 
Company, 2019). To distinguish between cases where repairs are materialised, results are 
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shown separately in Fig. 5. On the right-hand side, results for SCR are kept constant, whereas 
those of NSR are adjusted accordingly.  
Several observations can be made concerning the relationship between minimum RFR and ship 
size as well as the influence of geography on route competitiveness. First, the results show that 
there is always an advantage of using big vessels across every OD and route alternative, for 
these give a lower RFR than small vessels, all else being equal. Second, the economies of scale 
derived from bigger ship sizes in absolute terms decline when moving towards the shortest OD 
for a given route alternative. This means that scale economies are bigger for the NSR on the 
Yeosu-Rotterdam pair and smaller on the Vitino-Daesan pair, whereas the opposite holds true 
for the SCR. Moreover, the use of a LR3 tanker on the short-haul is less competitive than on 
the medium-haul due to STS transfer operation costs outside the port of Vitino. Fig. 6 shows 
this relationship with the long-haul curve for each route alternative being steeper than the short-
haul. Not only do costs fall with the increase in ship size, but also this decline is bigger in 
absolute terms at higher fuel prices for a given OD and route alternative. Third, the differential 
between SCR and NSR widens as we move from the long to the short-haul both with and 
without repairs. The SCR-RFR is gradually increased, whereas the NSR-RFR is decreased 
across all ship sizes.  
The lowest RFR for the SCR route was achieved with an LR3 tanker on the Yeosu-Rotterdam 
pair at 22 US$/t. For the NSR, this was given by an LR3 tanker on the Mongstad-Mizushima 
pair at 23.6 US$/t, whereas this would be 25.3 US$/t if repairs were included. These RFRs 
were actualised at low fuel prices (2015–2017), whereas they rose by 5.8 and 2.5 US$/t at high 
fuel prices (2011–2014) for the SCR and NSR respectively. Fig. 5 shows that the NSR was 
more competitive than the SCR at all ODs at high (2011–20 4) fuel prices and discounted fees. 
However, the SCR-NSR RFR differential was negative on the Yeosu-Rotterdam pair between 
-2 (MR) and -3 (LR3) US$/t and on the Mongstad-Mizushima pair for a LR3 tanker (-0.4 
US$/t) at low fuel prices and official fees, which were relatively low owing to the depreciation 
of the rouble in 2015, but still higher than the discounted ones. When including ice damage 
repairs in the model, the differential on the Yeosu-Rotterdam pair was also negative at low fuel 
prices as well as at high fuel prices for LR2 and LR3 tankers. It also narrowed significantly or 
became negative on the Mongstad-Mizushima pair between 9/−1.7 (MR) and 1.5/−2.1 US$/t 
(LR3) at high/low fuel prices. On the other hand, the Vitino-Daesan pair was less impacted in 
case repairs were needed for MR-LR2 tankers regardless of the fuel price levels. However, the 
differential narrowed significantly for LR3 tankers at low fuel prices and became negative 
when repairs were included. This is largely attributed to the STS transfer operation costs for a 
LR3 tanker outside the port of Vitino.  
 
  
    
    
    
 
Figure 5. Relationship between ship size and minimum RFR at a given OD at high (2011-
2014) and low (2015-2017) fuel prices, with and without ice damage repairs. 
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The differential on the long-haul would be lower if MGO was used in ECAs prior to 2015, due 
to a longer ECA leg for the NSR. On the other hand, the differential on the medium-haul would 
be higher due to a significantly shorter ECA leg for the NSR compared to the SCR. 
It should be mentioned that if the path north of the New Siberian Islands is not accessible, then 
the Sannikov Strait sets the upper boundary with regards to ship size or dwt utilisation. The 
draught restriction of 13m means that the SCR becomes more competitive at a given OD pair 
when using tankers bigger than a MR size (50,000 dwt) but this also depends on parcel sizes 
and dwt utilisation. 
 
 
Figure 6. Relationship between ship size and minimum RFR at a given distance at high 
(2011-2014) fuel prices. 
4.2. Current situation and environmental policy implications after 2020 
4.2.1. Optimal ship speed and alternative operational modes 
In this section, the NSR competitiveness against the SCR is investigated currently (2018). 
Three operational modes are assumed, including options to comply with the IMO 2020 sulphur 
limit. First, the use of HFO/MGO when operating outside and inside ECAs respectively, to 
reflect the period 2018–2019. Second, the use of MGO, and third, the installation of a scrubber 
to allow the use of HFO for operations after 2020. These two options also mean that the same 
fuel is used on all voyage legs. The relationship between minimum RFR and ship speed is 
graphically presented in Fig. 7. As in Section 4.1.1, results of a LR1 tanker round voyage on 
the Yeosu-Rotterdam pair are presented, whereas similar results for other ship sizes and ODs 
are reported in Appendix D. The left-hand side refers to the SCR and the right-hand side to the 
NSR. The average fuel prices in Rotterdam during 2018 are assumed, which were 
approximately 400 US$/t for HFO and 600 US$/t for MGO (Clarksons, 2019). Fig. 7 shows 
that currently, the round voyage optimal speed on the SCR is 14.3 knots at a RFR of 36.3 US$/t. 
The use of a scrubber increases the optimal speed by 0.3 to 14.6 knots at a RFR of 37 US$/t. 
On the other hand, the option to use MGO, lowers the optimal speed at 12.3 knots and gives a 
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
MR LR1 LR2 LR3
R
F
R
 in
 U
S
$
 p
er
 to
nn
e
Ship size
RFR of 41.1 US$/t. For the NSR, currently the round voyage optimal speed stands at 12.5 knots 
and gives a RFR of 36 US$/t, whereas the HFO-scrubber option slightly increases the optimal 
speed at 12.8 knots and gives a RFR of 36.2 US$/t. The MGO option lowers the optimal speed 
at 11.4 knots and increases the RFR at 39.6 US$/t. The increase in optimal speed when using 
a scrubber at a given fuel price is due to additional capital and operating costs that this option 
entails, which become more important than fuel costs. On the other hand, the use of the more 
expensive MGO fuel results in the lowering of the optimal speed, which becomes more 
important than other costs. Both the MGO and HFO-scrubber options shift the RFR curves 
upwards to the right, with the first having a bigger magnitude on the SCR-NSR RFR 
differential. As in 4.1.1, the trade-off between fixed and variable costs is reflected in the U-
shaped nature of the curves. Optimal laden speeds are lower by 0.9–1.7 knots than optimal 
ballast ones, whilst optimal speeds on ECA legs are around 0.8 (NSR) −2.1 (SCR) knots lower 
than on non-ECA legs. 
    
 
Figure 7. Relationship between optimal speed and minimum RFR for LR1 Mongstad-
Mizushima at three alternative operational modes currently (2018) and following IMO 2020.  
4.2.2. Ship size, alternative operational modes and distance 
Fig. 8 shows the relationship between minimum RFR at the optimal speed and ship size 
currently. The NSR is used as a basis of comparison, and results are reported for the Yeosu-
Rotterdam and Vitino-Daesan pairs. The results for Mongstad-Mizushima are included in 
Appendix D. The lowest RFR for the SCR route is achieved when using an LR3 tanker on the 
long-haul at 24.7 US$/t. For the NSR, this is given by an LR3 tanker on the medium-haul at 
24.8 US$/t, whereas this becomes 26.5 US$/t if ice damage repairs are included. These RFRs 
refer to the HFO/MGO mode, whereas they rise by 3 and 2.4 US$/t at the MGO mode for the 
SCR and NSR respectively. As can be seen, the NSR is the most competitive alternative for all 
ship sizes on the short-haul at any operational mode, whereas the SCR-NSR RFR differential 
narrows significantly on the long-haul, and becomes negative for LR2 and LR3 tankers at any 
operational mode. The differential at the HFO/MGO option is found between 0 (MR) and −1.7 
(LR3) US$/t. The MGO option raises the difference 
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between 1.8 (MR) and −0.9 (LR3) US$/t. The differential on the short-haul at the HFO/MGO 
option is between 12.5 (MR) and 2.2 (LR3) US$/t, and is further increased at the MGO option 
between 15.7 (MR) and 3.5 (LR3) US$/t. When including ice damage repairs, it becomes 
negative on the Yeosu-Rotterdam pair, regardless of the operational mode, whereas that on the 
short-haul is less affected. Results for the Mongstad-Mizushima pair are found in between the 
long and short-haul. However, the use of a LR3 tanker on the medium-haul is more competitive 
than on the short-haul due to STS transfer operation costs. The differential at the HFO/MGO 
option is found between 6.8 (MR) and 1.3 (LR3) US$/t and is increased between 8.6 (MR) and 
1.9 (LR3) US$/t at the MGO option. Clearly, the MGO option mostly benefits the NSR, 
followed by the HFO-scrubber and HFO/MGO options across all ship sizes and ODs8. The 
same observations can be made regarding scale economies as in Section 4.1.2. 
    
    
 
 
8 An exception in this paper is the Mongstad-Mizushima pair, where the HFO/MG  mode gives slightly higher RFR 
differentials than the HFO-scrubber mode due to the disproportionately higher ECA leg on the SCR than on the NSR. This 
gives NSR a big advantage under the HFO/MGO mode. 
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Figure 8. Relationship between ship size and minimum RFR at a given OD at three 
alternative operational modes currently (2018) and following IMO 2020. 
 
Table 6 presents a breakdown of the results in the form of fixed and variable costs across all 
ODs at the HFO/MGO mode. It can be seen that scale economies exist in every cost factor by 
using bigger ships. For the NSR, these are more prominent on the long-haul, whereas for the 
SCR are found to be greater on the short-haul. For the SCR, capital costs is the most important 
factor, followed by fuel and operating costs, and Suez Canal tolls. Exceptions are LR3, and 
LR2 and LR3 tankers on the medium and long-haul respectively, where tolls become the third 
important cost factor followed by operating costs. For the NSR, capital costs and ice breaking 
fees are the primary cost factors for MR and LR1 sizes on the long-haul. Ice breaking fees 
become the largest cost factor for LR2 and LR3 sizes, followed by capital costs on the long-
haul. Ice breaking fees is the primary cost factor for both medium and short-haul, followed by 
capital, operating and fuel costs, and repairs across all vessel sizes.  
Table 6. Total cost analysis in US$/t between SCR and NSR currently (2018). 
 SCR     NSR      
Ship Size 
(DWT 
tonnes) 
Fuel 
Cost 
Transit 
Fees 
Operating 
Cost 
Capital 
Cost RFR 
Fuel 
Cost 
Transit 
Fees 
Operating 
Cost 
Capital 
Cost Repairs RFR 
Yeosu - Rotterdam 
MR 14.3 9.6 14.0 14.9 52.8 10.1 14.5 13.2 15.0 5.7 52.8 
LR1 9.7 7.0 8.7 10.9 36.3 6.9 10.1 8.1 10.9 3.3 36.0 
LR2 7.3 6.2 5.8 8.8 28.1 5.3 9.8 5.3 8.7 2.2 29.1 
LR3 6.3 5.6 5.1 7.7 24.7 4.6 9.6 4.6 7.6 1.7 26.4 
Mongstad - Mizushima 
MR 15.4 9.6 15.1 16.1 56.2 9.0 14.5 12.2 13.7 5.7 49.4 
LR1 10.5 7.0 9.4 11.8 38.7 6.2 10.1 7.5 10 3.3 33.8 
LR2 7.8 6.2 6.3 9.4 29.7 4.7 9.8 4.9 7.9 2.2 27.3 
LR3 6.8 5.6 5.4 8.3 26.1 4.1 9.6 4.2 6.9 1.7 24.8 
Vitino - Daesan 
MR 17.0 9.6 16.6 17.7 60.9 8.7 14.5 11.9 13.3 5.7 48.4 
LR1 11.5 7.0 10.3 12.9 41.7 5.9 10.1 7.3 9.7 3.3 33.0 
LR2 8.6 6.2 6.9 10.4 32.1 4.6 9.8 4.8 7.7 2.2 26.9 
LR3 7.5 5.6 6.0 9.1 28.2 4.0 9.6 4.1 6.7 1.7 26.0 
 
Fig. 9 illustrates results when considering a global fuel tax (Cariou and Faury, 2015; Lindstad 
and Eskeland, 2015), and a future ban on the use of HFO in the Arctic. The dashed curves 
denote the HFO-scrubber option for both route alternatives on the long and short-haul, where 
a global fuel tax is imposed on HFO. The results for Mongstad-Mizushima are included in 
Appendix D. A fuel tax of 100 US$/t raises the current price of HFO from 400 to 711.4 US$/t. 
The results indicate that the NSR, being a shorter alternative, benefits from this. The NSR 
appears to be more competitive in all ODs except for LR3 tankers on the Yeosu-Rotterdam pair 
and when repairs are included on this OD pair.  
The introduction of a ban on the use of HFO in the Arctic is also investigated. Under such a 
scenario, the MGO option or any other distillate or fuel type would be the only options for the 
NSR, whereas the HFO-scrubber option would be the cheapest alternative on the SCR. In Fig. 
9, black solid curves denote a HFO-scrubber option for the SCR and grey solid curves the use 
of MGO on the NSR. Under this scenario, the NSR is mainly competitive on the Vitino-Daesan 
pair. On the other hand, the SCR-NSR RFR differential is negative on the Yeosu-Rotterdam 
pair, either when including repairs or not. For the Mongstad-Mizushima pair, the differential 
is between 2.3 (MR) and -0.9 (LR3) US$/t, whereas the RFR is negative across all vessel sizes 
when repairs are included. Clearly, such a policy significantly reduces the potential of the NSR 
over that of the SCR. 
    
    
 
Figure 9. Relationship between ship size and RFR at a given OD with environmental costs 
currently (2018) and following IMO 2020. 
4.3. Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, the results are tested against important cost and operational factors that affect 
the competitiveness of a route alternative. The base case refers to the operational period after 
the implementation of the IMO 2020 sulphur limit (either HFO-scrubber or MGO modes), 
using the results of 2018 as a reference. Both official and discounted fees are included in the 
analysis to take into account of the dependence between oil prices, fuel prices and the 
USD/RUB exchange rates (Beckmann and Czudaj, 2013; Yang et al., 2017; Chuffart and 
Hooper, 2019). It is assumed, drawing on historic data, that a high USD/RUB rate of 62.99 
corresponds at low fuel prices (200, 400 US$/t for HFO, and 300, 600 US/t for MGO) and a 
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low USD/RUB rate of 33.21 at high fuel prices (600 US$/t for HFO and 900 US$/t for MGO) 
(Bloomberg, 2019, Clarksons, 2019). Table 7 reports the SCR-NSR RFR differential, including 
repairs on the NSR, by using results of a LR1 tanker on the long and shorthauls as an example. 
The base case is compared to that of independent navigation, assuming relatively easy ice 
conditions and therefore no ice breaking assistance. A drop of the speed on ice by 50%, that is 
5.3 knots, is also included to take into account of uncertainty due to delays arising when a ship 
operates independently. It is shown that using the official ice breaking fees, the NSR is less 
competitive on both OD pairs not only at low fuel prices, but also at high fuel prices due to a 
low USD/RUB rate, which dramatically increases ice breaking fees. The results also reflect 
that should the NSRA used the official fees before 2014, the NSR would be never competitive, 
although fuel prices were at historic highs at that time. On the other hand, fuel prices become 
more influential with a more competitive NSR fee policy at high fuel prices and vice versa. 
Table 7. Sensitivity of ice breaking fees and speed on ice for LR1 tanker RFR in US$/t from 2020. 
   Yeosu – Rotterdam  Vitino – Daesan 
HFO & Scrubber and MGO modes for both SCR and NSR 
Fuel Type 
Fuel 
Price 
Base 
Case & 
Official 
Fees 
Base Case 
& 
Discounted 
Fees 
Independent 
navigation 
Independent 
navigation & 
speed on ice -
50% 
Base Case 
& 
Official 
Fees 
Base Case 
& 
Discounted 
Fees 
Independent 
navigation 
Independent 
navigation & 
speed on ice -
50% 
 200   -4.5 -3.0 5.7 1.5 2.3 3.7 12.4            8.1 
HFO 400   -3.0 -1.6 7.1 4.0 5.2 6.7 15.3          12.1 
 600 -11.2 -0.7 7.9 5.4      -1.7 8.8 17.5          14.8 
 300   -3.7 -2.2 6.4 3.3 3.8 5.3 13.9          10.6 
MGO 600   -2.3 -0.8 7.8 5.6 7.2 8.6 17.3          14.8 
 900 -10.5  0.0 8.7 7.0 0.4       10.9 19.6          17.7 
SCR – HFO & Scrubber and NSR – MGO 
 200/300   -6.5 -5.0 3.6 0.5 0.5 2.0          10.6           7.3 
HFO/MGO 400/600   -6.4 -4.9 3.7 1.5 2.3 3.7          12.4           9.9 
 600/900 -15.2 -4.7 4.0 2.3      -5.2 5.3          14.0          12.1 
The NSR is always more competitive than the SCR when independent navigation is assumed, 
even on the long-haul and across all fuel types and prices. The short-haul benefits mostly as is 
expected. A 50% drop of the speed on ice affects the RFR differential at a high degree but 
retains the competitiveness of the NSR, especially under high fuel prices. When it comes to the 
use of MGO only on the NSR, the differential becomes negative on the long-haul either using 
the official or discounted fees at any fuel price levels. It also becomes negative on the short-
haul when using the official fees at high fuel prices and a low USD/RUB rate. On the other 
hand, the NSR is always more competitive than the SCR when independent navigation and/or 
a 50% drop of the speed on ice is assumed on both OD pairs. 
5. Discussion and conclusions  
Fuel price movements along with a competitive ice breaking fees policy, and high piracy 
insurance premiums in a lesser extent explain the competitiveness of the NSR against the 
longer SCR during the period 2011–2014. Moreover, distance savings, which increase when 
moving towards the short-haul, also mean a wider RFR differential between SCR and NSR. 
Bigger ships achieve a lower RFR across every OD and route alternative, all else being equal. 
Moreover, cost savings increase in absolute terms at higher fuel prices for a given OD pair and 
route alternative, assuming discounted ice breaking fees. The majority of clean product tanker 
voyages (20 out of 32) occurred between the Murmansk area and Northeast Asia. The results 
for the Vitino-Daesan pair clearly reflects this, since it is the most competitive OD. On the 
other hand, seven voyages occurred from Mongstad to Japan (1), and S. Korea to the Rotterdam 
area (6) (CHNL, 2019; Bloomberg, 2019). Although more voyages occurred between 
Northwest Europe and Northeast Asia than between Mongstad to destinations in Northeast 
Asia, this could be explained by other factors, such as the commodities shipped at each itinerary 
and their market characteristics during that period. The NSR was still more competitive than 
the SCR during 2014 across all ODs and ship sizes examined in this paper, assuming 
discounted fees and no repairs9. However, it was only used by Russian-flagged tankers. A re-
direction of condensate and naphtha flows from the Barents and White Seas to Baltic terminals 
(Bambulyak et al., 2015; Tanker Company, 2019; Logistics Company, 2019), and diplomatic 
tensions between Russia and the west had a negative impact on the use of the NSR amongst 
others (Reuters, 2015, Platts, 2016). Further, a drop in crude oil prices by 46% between 2014 
and 2015 resulted in a decline of 41 and 50% in MGO and HFO prices10 respectively. The 
results show that the NSR was only competitive in the short-haul and marginally competitive 
in the medium-haul for MR, LR1 and LR2 tankers, but not competitive when repairs are 
included in the analysis. However, with no petroleum products flows from the White Sea, and 
due to the western sanctions, there was no interest on the route. In addition, oil-related 
commodity prices and piracy insurance premiums became lower, meaning that lead times and 
piracy risks were not deemed as critical as in 2011–20 4. Another important factor is the 
provision for ice damage repairs. When these repairs are factored in the model, they increase 
the NSR-RFR by 1.7 (LR3) and 5.7 (MR) US$/t. 
Fuel prices in 2018 – HFO/MGO at 400/600 US$ per tonne – and a high USD/RUB rate of 
65.78 (Bloomberg, 2019) following the rouble depreciation since 2015, indicate that the NSR 
is a competitive alternative for voyages originating from Vitino to destinations in South Korea, 
 
9 Following the introduction of new tariffs in 2014, these were still prohibitive during that year for all OD pairs owing to a 
USD/RUB rate of 38.73 (Bloomberg, 2019). Therefore, discounted fees are assumed for that year too. 
10 The crude oil price refers to Brent crude, and both HFO and MGO to annual mean prices in Rotterdam (Clarksons, 2019). 
but marginally competitive from Mongstad to Japan when repairs are included. On the other 
hand, the RFR differential between SCR and NSR is marginal for voyages between the 
Rotterdam area and S. Korea, and becomes negative when repairs are included in the 
calculations. The results show that shipowners who will opt for the use of the expensive MGO 
following the IMO 2020 sulphur limit, will benefit from using the NSR. The HFO-scrubber 
option comes second, since it is in between the HFO/MGO and MGO-only option.  
The sensitivity analysis indicates that ice breaking fees is a crucial factor, which considerably 
affects the competitiveness of the NSR at any OD and ship size. High fuel prices are important 
but cannot determine the competitiveness of the NSR alone. It is shown that considerably high 
official fees due to a low USD/RUB rate outweigh any benefit that the use of the NSR gives at 
high fuel prices. This largely explains the practice of negotiated or discounted fees before 2014, 
when fees were determined by the USD/RUB rate and a maximum fee of 530 roubles per tonne 
of liquid cargo (ARCTIS, 2019b). It should also be noted that discounted fees varied from case 
to case (Falck, 2012). According to Tanker Company (2019) and Moe and Brigham (2016), 
regular users of the route could be granted even lower discounted fees than those mentioned 
by Atomflot and used in this paper (in Gritsenko and Kiiski, 2016; Falck, 2012). This explains 
why certain voyages from Vitino or Mongstad to destinations such as in Thailand, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Malaysia were conducted at that time, since the tankers were either owned or 
chartered by companies which conducted 24 of the 32 product tanker voyages. Further, the 
relatively smaller or sometimes negative SCR-NSR RFR differential for LR2 and LR3 tankers 
than for MR and LR1 across all cases and scenarios can be partly explained by the fact that ice 
breaking fees increase proportionally more than Suez Canal tolls with vessel size.  
The results show that a combination of high fuel prices and independent navigation 
considerably widens the SCR-NSR RFR differential. Furthermore, a 50% reduction in speed 
through ice significantly reduces the potential of the NSR, especially on the long-haul. These 
findings are in line with Wergeland (1992), Liu and Kronbak (2010), Lu et al (2014), and Xu 
et al. (2018). Lasserre (2014, 2015) argues that fuel cost savings alone cannot determine the 
competitiveness of the NSR. In addition, the inverse relationship between fuel prices and 
official ice breaking fees is also in line with Shibashaki et al. (2018). Moreover, if ships are not 
able to use the path north of the New Siberian Islands, then the SCR is always more competitive 
when using big tankers at any OD regardless of any other factors. However, this also depends 
on parcel sizes, which for oil product trades they could be around 22% lower than the maximum 
ship capacity (Stopford, 2009), and could enable e.g. LR2/Aframax tankers to go through the 
Sannikov Strait. Not only are economies of scale and/or high dwt utilisation important for the 
cost-competitiveness of the NSR (Wergeland, 1992; Lasserre, 2014, 2015; Furuichi and 
Otsuka, 2015; Zhang et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2018), but also these contribute to lower 
environmental costs (Zhu et al., 2018). The results also show that the consideration of 
environmental costs leads to opposing outcomes. A future environmental policy which aims to 
ban the use and carriage of HFO in the Arctic over concerns for accidents and potential oil 
spills in this sensitive environment (Roy and Comer, 2017), significantly reduces the potential 
of the NSR. In particular, the NSR is only competitive on the Vitino-Daesan pair, and 
marginally or even uncompetitive on the Mongstad-Mizushima and Yeosu-Rotterdam pairs. 
On the other hand, it was found that a (theoretical) tax on HFO globally, favours low speeds 
and the use of the shorter Arctic routes. These results agree with Cariou and Faury (2015) who 
also considered environmental costs in the form of a CO2 tax and with Wan et al. (2018), who 
conclude that a ban of HFO in the Arctic lowers the economic potential of the NSR. This paper 
investigates the feasibility of the NSR for product tanker trades at the tactical/operational level 
for round voyages at the summer/autumn season. It contributes to the literature in several ways. 
The main factors examined are distance, ship size, fuel types and prices, and ice breaking fees. 
Whilst ship sizes, distances, fuel prices and ice breaking fees have been widely explored in the 
literature concerning liner operations on NSR (Theocharis et al., 2018), there is a limited 
understanding as to how they affect tanker operations (Zhang et al., 2016). Further, this is the 
first study to investigate the impact of the IMO Sulphur 2020 limit, and alternative operational 
modes concerning fuel types and technologies in the context of Arctic shipping. The impact of 
a ban on HFO in the Arctic is also explored for the first time for tanker trades. Furthermore, 
the optimal speed which minimises the RFR constitutes a decision variable. It is dynamically 
adjusted as theory suggests (Alderton, 1981; Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2013) with respect to the 
factors that affect it such as displacement and payload, capital, operating and fuel costs. 
Although Cariou and Faury (2015) also attempted to optimise speed with respect to freight 
rates and fuel prices, they used a range of optimal speeds assuming equal transit times in both 
SCR and NSR and at a constant fuel price level. In addition, the relationship between fuel 
prices and ice breaking fees is investigated by considering both official and discounted fees. 
The results of this study are based on up to date secondary data, and most importantly on 
primary data related to Arctic-specific cost factors which might change over time. The 
complexity of Arctic maritime operations and the relatively small ice class fleet globally 
(Solakivi et al., 2018; Tseng and Cullinane, 2018), increase the variability of estimates and 
underline the difficulty of obtaining reliable parameters (Lasserre, 2014). For example, the 
shipowner who provided the primary data for this paper, highlighted that the price for an ice-
class vessel can be negotiable and sometimes not so higher than that of an ordinary vessel. Ice 
breaking fees depend on the number of escorting zones amongst others. The number of zones 
used depend on the ice class of the ship, navigation season and local climatic and ice conditions 
(Faury and Cariou, 2016). On the other hand, the uncertainty of the NSRA tariff policy 
underlines that fees vary depending on political and economic factors (Gritsenko and Kiiski, 
2016; Moe and Brigham, 2016). It could be argued that ice breaking assistance of ships larger 
than a LR1 tanker may require the use of more than one ice breakers due to their wide beams, 
which may have a direct impact on costs and entail diseconomies of scale. Besides, there have 
been cases were tankers with beams smaller than those of the ice breakers were assisted by two 
or more ice breakers as well as large tankers which were assisted by one ice breaker 
(Bambulyak et al., 2015; NSRA, 2016). In addition, all LR2 tanker voyages in 2013 were 
assisted by one rather than two ice breakers (NSRA, 2016). This implies that local ice and 
climatic conditions play an important role independent of the ship size. In this paper it is 
assumed that the use of more than one ice breakers is factored in the official fees, following 
the logic of the official NSRA fees (NSRA, 2014) as well as the estimations that the online 
calculator of NSRA provides for large vessels (NSRA, 2019). Future research could shed light 
on this issue i.e. whether ice breaking fees are charged on the basis of the service provided at 
the respective fee for a certain tanker size (NSRA, 2014) or are based on the number of ice 
breakers used per se. Moreover, transit voyages on the NSR are still exploratory in nature not 
least because of the uncertainty related to climatic and ice conditions, transit times, minimal 
infrastructure, remoteness and safety (Farré et al., 2014; Faury and Cariou, 2016; Aksenov et 
al., 2017; Fedi et al., 2018; Tseng and Cullinane, 2018). Exceptions include ships serving 
specific projects or are under the ownership of industrial carriers, such as the Yamal LNG 
tankers or the fleet of Norilsk Nickel. Geopolitical issues may also affect petroleum flows, even 
if a route is a viable alternative. This is clearly shown with the re-direction of flows from the 
Murmansk/White Sea region to the Baltic since 2014. Besides, gas condensate flows from the 
Russian Arctic to Northeast Asia have recently re-emerged owing to the new Yamal/Sabetta 
condensate grade (Platts, 2018). In addition, 68% of the global ice class fleet is more than 10 
years old, meaning that increased repairs and maintenance costs may restrict the use of this 
tonnage in more conventional trades (Gibson, 2018). Future research could focus on new 
technologies, other fuel types and operational modes, as well as future emissions and 
environmental regulation. The recent voyage of the LNG-powered Aframax tanker Lomonosov 
Prospect between South Korea and West Europe confirmed the viability of such voyages 
(MarEx, 2018). Wider geographical implications, commodity prices and cargo value could 
complement the transport cost analysis for tanker or other trades. 
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Appendix A 
Port Tanker Terminals Berths Max DWT Max LOA (m) Max draught (m) 
Yeosu GS Galtex Crude Oil 
Terminal 
No. 1 (Crude oil & 
Clean Products) 
255,000 330 20.5 
 GS Galtex Product 
Terminal 
No. 3/5 35,000/50,000 183/195 11.3/12 
 LPG & E-1 Gas 
Terminal 
LPG Terminal 
(LPG, Chemicals & 
Clean Products) 
65,200 249.8 12.6 
 Sapo Terminal No. 1 Tank Terminal 
Quay 
100,000 280 N.A. 
 KNOC Terminal No. 1/2/3 80,000/120,000/320,000 340/380/440 13.9/15.5/17.7 
Rotterdam* 20 Terminals  50,000-355,000 185-366 11-16.1 
Mongstad Mongstad Refinery 
(Equinor, former 
Statoil) 
Crude Oil Jetty 
No.1 (Crude & 
Clean Products) 
380,000 350 23 
  Jetty No. 14 (STS) 440,000 380 25 
 Product Jetty No. 2/8/9 90,000/60,000/50,802 240/235/235 14.5/16.4/16.4 
Mizushima Nippon Petroleum No .5/6 114,106/314,026 250/340 16 
 Japan Energy No. 1 114,106 250 N.A. 
Vitino Vitino Terminal No. 3/4 116,000/80,000 249/230 15.4/10.9 
      
Daesan Seetec Terminal MDH-21/23/ 
MDK-15/16 
100,000/50,000/ 
100,000/45,000 
280/219/ 
280/200 
12.5/12.7/ 
14.9/12 
  Samsung 
Petrochemical 
MDS-31 
100,000 270 14 
  KNOC 325,000 330 23 
Source: IHS Maritime, 2015. Ports and Terminals Guide 2015-2016. *20 terminals/berths were identified, which explicitly refer to clean oil 
products.
Appendix B 
Ship Size Suez Canal Tolls in US$ NSR Ice Breaking Fees in US$ 
 2011-2014a 2015-2017b 2018c 2011-2014d 2015-2017e 2018f 
LR3 684,083 627,420 669,212 1,038,750 1,188,021 1,120,836 
LR2 574,683 526,985 559,965 786,375 910,816 859,308 
LR1 434,711 398,355 419,343 519,375 615,611 580,797 
MR 352,166 322,756 335,210 321,250 509,771 480,942 
aSDR=1.53 US$ & 2011-2014 tariffs, bSDR=1.40 US$ & 2015-2017 tariffs, cSDR=1.40 US$ & current tariffs (2018), (IMF, 
2019, Leth agencies, 2019a), d5 US$/t of cargo & 2.5 US$/displacement tonne (Gritsenko and Kiiski, 2015, Lasserre, 2015, 
Falck, 2012, Tanker Company, 2019, Logistics Company, 2019), eFor Arc4 (1A) ice class ships and 6/7 escorting zones 
during the summer/autumn season: 536.21 Roubles/GT for a MR tanker, 446.84 Roubles/GT for LR1,LR2, LR3 tankers at 
USD/RUB exchange rate of 62.06 (2015-2017 average), fsame as e at a USD/RUB exchange rate of 65.78 (2018 average) 
(NSRA, 2014), (Bloomberg, 2019). 
  
Appendix C. Results for the periods 2011-2014 and 2015-2017.  
 
Yeosu – Rotterdam 
 
SCR 
   
NSR 
    
Differential 
(US$/t) 
Differential incl.  
ice damage repairs 
(US$/t) 
Ship 
Size 
Speed 
(knots) 
RFR 
(US$/t) 
Speed 
(knots) 
RFR 
(US$/t) 
RFR incl. ice 
damage repairs 
(US$/t)   
HFO = 600 US$ per tonne 
MR 12.7 60.7 11.6 52.7 58.4  8.0   2.3 
LR1 12.6 41.5 11.6 38.0 41.4  3.5   0.1 
LR2 12.2 31.8 11.3 30.6 32.8  1.2 -1.0 
LR3 12.2 27.8 11.4 27.7 29.3  0.1 -1.5 
HFO = 260 & MGO = 450 US$ per tonne 
MR 15.9 47.4 13.6 49.4 55.1 -2.0 -7.7 
LR1 15.7 32.5 13.5 33.8 37.1 -1.3 -4.6 
LR2 15.5 25.1 13.3 27.5 29.7 -2.4 -4.6 
LR3 15.5 22.0 13.3 25.0 26.7 -3.0 -4.7 
 
Mongstad – Mizushima 
 
SCR 
   
NSR 
    
Differential 
(US$/t) 
Differential incl.  
ice damage repairs 
(US$/t) 
Ship 
Size 
Speed 
(knots) 
RFR 
(US$/t) 
Speed 
(knots) 
RFR 
(US$/t) 
RFR incl. ice 
damage repairs 
(US$/t)   
HFO = 600 US$ per tonne 
MR 12.7 64.0 11.6 49.3 55.0  14.7  9.0 
LR1 12.6 43.7 11.5 35.7 39.0  8.0  4.7 
LR2 12.2 33.5 11.3 28.9 31.1  4.6  2.4 
LR3 12.2 29.3 11.3 26.1 27.8  3.2  1.5 
HFO = 260 & MGO = 450 US$ per tonne 
MR 15.8 50.3 13.6 46.3 52.0  4.0 -1.7 
LR1 15.6 34.5 13.5 31.7 35.0  2.8 -0.5 
LR2 15.3 26.5 13.4 25.9 28.2  0.6 -1.7 
LR3 15.4 23.2 13.4 23.6 25.3 -0.4 -2.1 
 
Vitino – Daesan 
 
SCR 
   
NSR 
    
Differential 
(US$/t) 
Differential incl.  
ice damage repairs (US$/t) 
Ship 
Size 
Speed 
(knots) 
RFR 
(US$/t) 
Speed 
(knots) 
RFR 
(US$/t) 
RFR incl. ice 
damage repairs 
(US$/t)   
HFO = 600 US$ per tonne 
MR 12.7 70.1 11.6 48.3 54.0 21.8 16.1 
LR1 12.6 47.8 11.5 35.0 38.4 12.8  9.4 
LR2 12.2 36.5 11.3 28.3 30.6   8.2  5.9 
LR3 12.2 31.9 11.3 27.3 28.9   4.6  3.0 
HFO = 260 & MGO = 450 US$ per tonne 
MR 16.0 54.2 13.6 45.5 51.2   8.7  3.0 
LR1 15.8 37.1 13.5 31.1 34.4   6.0  2.7 
LR2 15.6 28.5 13.3 25.5 27.7   3.0  0.8 
LR3 15.6 24.9 13.3 24.8 26.5   0.1 -1.6 
Appendix D. Results for 2018 including environmental costs. 
 
Yeosu – Rotterdam 
 
SCR 
     
NSR 
      
Differential 
(US$/t) 
Differential incl. 
repairs (US$/t) 
Ship 
Size 
Speed 
(knots) 
Fuel 
Cost 
(US$/t) 
Transit 
Fees 
(US$/t) 
Operating 
Cost 
(US$/t) 
Capital 
Cost 
(US$/t) 
RFR 
(US$/t) 
Speed 
(knots) 
Fuel 
Cost 
(US$/t) 
Transit 
Fees 
(US$/t) 
Operating 
Cost 
(US$/t) 
Capital 
Cost 
(US$/t) 
RFR 
(US$/t) 
RFR incl. 
repairs 
(US$/t) 
  
HFO = 400 US$/t 
MR 14.5 14.3 9.6 14 14.9 52.8 12.6 10.1 14.5 13.2 15.0 52.8 58.5   0.0 -5.7 
LR1 14.3 9.7 7 8.7 10.9 36.3 12.5 6.9 10.1 8.1 10.9 36.0 39.3   0.3 -3.0 
LR2 13.8 7.3 6.2 5.8 8.8 28.1 12.3 5.3 9.8 5.3 8.7 29.1 31.3 -1.0 -3.2 
LR3 13.9 6.3 5.6 5.1 7.7 24.7 12.3 4.6 9.6 4.6 7.6 26.4 28.1 -1.7 -3.4 
HFO & Scrubber at 400 US$/t 
MR 14.7 14.7 9.6 13.8 15.9 54.0 12.8 10.1 14.5 12.9 15.7 53.2 58.9  0.8 -4.9 
LR1 14.6   9.9 7.0 8.6 11.5 37.0 12.8 6.9 10.1 7.9 11.3 36.2 39.5  0.8 -2.5 
LR2 14.1   7.4 6.2 5.7 9.2 28.5 12.5 5.3 9.8 5.2 8.9 29.2 31.4 -0.7 -2.9 
LR3 14.2   6.4 5.6 5.0 8.0 25.0 12.5 4.6 9.6 4.5 7.8 26.5 28.2 -1.5 -3.2 
MGO = 600 US$/t 
MR 12.5 16.6 9.6 16.3 17.3 59.8 11.5 12.8 14.5 14.3 16.4 58.0 63.7  1.8 -3.9 
LR1 12.3 11.3 7.0 10.1 12.7 41.1 11.4 8.8 10.1 8.7 12.0 39.6 42.9  1.5 -1.8 
LR2 11.9 8.4 6.2 6.8 10.2 31.6 11.2 6.7 9.8 5.8 9.5 31.8 34.0 -0.2 -2.4 
LR3 12.0 7.3 5.6 5.9 8.9 27.7 11.2 5.8 9.6 4.9 8.3 28.6 30.3 -0.9 -2.6 
HFO = 400US$/t +100 US$/t CO2 Tax = 711.4 US$/t 
MR 12.2 17.8 9.6 16.6 19.2 63.2 11.3 13.9 14.5 14.5 17.9 60.8 66.5  2.4 -3.3 
LR1 12.0 12.0 7.0 10.3 13.9 43.2 11.2 9.5 10.1 8.9 12.9 41.4 44.7  1.8 -1.5 
LR2 11.6 9.0 6.2 6.9 11.1 33.2 11.0 7.2 9.8 5.9 10.2 33.1 35.3  0.1 -2.1 
LR3 11.7 7.8 5.6 6.0 9.7 29.1 11.0 6.3 9.6 5.0 8.9 29.8 31.5 -0.7 -2.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mongstad – Mizushima 
 
SCR 
     
NSR 
      
Differential 
(US$/t) 
Differential incl. 
repairs (US$/t) 
Ship 
Size 
Speed 
(knots) 
Fuel 
Cost 
(US$/t) 
Transit 
Fees 
(US$/t) 
Operating 
Cost 
(US$/t) 
Capital 
Cost 
(US$/t) 
RFR 
(US$/t) 
Speed 
(knots) 
Fuel 
Cost 
(US$/t) 
Transit 
Fees 
(US$/t) 
Operating 
Cost 
(US$/t) 
Capital 
Cost 
(US$/t) 
RFR 
(US$/t) 
RFR incl. 
repairs 
(US$/t) 
  
HFO = 400 US$/t 
MR 14.4 15.4 9.6 15.1 16.1 56.2 12.6 9.0 14.5 12.2 13.7 49.4 55.1 6.8  1.1 
LR1 14.2 10.5 7 9.4 11.8 38.7 12.6 6.2 10.1 7.5 10.0 33.8 37.1 4.9  1.6 
LR2 13.7 7.8 6.2 6.3 9.4 29.7 12.3 4.7 9.8 4.9 7.9 27.3 29.5 2.4  0.2 
LR3 13.8 6.8 5.6 5.4 8.3 26.1 12.3 4.1 9.6 4.2 6.9 24.8 26.5 1.3 -0.4 
HFO & Scrubber at 400 US$/t 
MR 14.7 15.7 9.6 14.7 16.9 56.9 12.7 9.1 14.5 12.1 14.5 50.2 55.9 6.7  1.0 
LR1 14.6 10.6 7.0 9.1 12.2 38.9 12.7 6.2 10.1 7.4 10.4 34.1 37.4 4.8  1.5 
LR2 14.1 7.9 6.2 6.1 9.8 30.0 12.4 4.8 9.8 4.9 8.2 27.7 29.9 2.3  0.1 
LR3 14.2 6.9 5.6 5.3 8.5 26.3 12.4 4.2 9.6 4.2 7.2 25.2 26.9 1.1 -0.6 
MGO = 600 US$/t 
MR 12.5 17.8 9.6 17.3 18.5 63.2 11.4 11.7 14.5 13.3 15.1 54.6 60.3 8.6  2.9 
LR1 12.3 12.1 7.0 10.8 13.5 43.4 11.4 8.0 10.1 8.1 11.0 37.2 40.5 6.2  2.9 
LR2 11.9 9.0 6.2 7.2 10.9 33.3 11.2 6.1 9.8 5.4 8.7 30.0 32.2 3.3  1.1 
LR3 12.0 7.8 5.6 6.2 9.5 29.1 11.2 5.3 9.6 4.6 7.7 27.2 28.9 1.9  0.2 
HFO = 400US$/t +100 US$/t CO2 Tax = 711.4 US$/t 
MR 12.2 19.0 9.6 17.7 20.5 66.8 11.2 12.6 14.5 13.4 16.4 56.9 62.6 9.9  4.2 
LR1 12.0 12.8 7.0 11.0 14.8 45.6 11.2 8.6 10.1 8.2 11.8 38.7 42.0 6.9  3.6 
LR2 11.6 9.6 6.2 7.4 11.9 35.1 11.0 6.6 9.8 5.4 9.3 31.1 33.3 4.0  1.8 
LR3 11.7 8.3 5.6 6.4 10.3 30.6 11.0 5.8 9.6 4.7 8.2 28.3 30.0 2.3  0.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vitino – Daesan 
 
SCR 
     
NSR 
      
Differential 
(US$/t) 
Differential incl. 
repairs (US$/t) 
Ship 
Size 
Speed 
(knots) 
Fuel 
Cost 
(US$/t) 
Transit 
Fees 
(US$/t) 
Operating 
Cost 
(US$/t) 
Capital 
Cost 
(US$/t) 
RFR 
(US$/t) 
Speed 
(knots) 
Fuel 
Cost 
(US$/t) 
Transit 
Fees 
(US$/t) 
Operating 
Cost 
(US$/t) 
Capital 
Cost 
(US$/t) 
RFR 
(US$/t) 
RFR incl. 
repairs 
(US$/t) 
  
HFO = 400 US$/t 
MR 14.5 17.0 9.6 16.6 17.7 60.9 12.6 8.7 14.5 11.9 13.3 48.4 54.1 12.5 6.8 
LR1 14.4 11.5 7.0 10.3 12.9 41.7 12.6 5.9 10.1 7.3 9.7 33.0 36.3 8.7 5.4 
LR2 13.9 8.6 6.2 6.9 10.4 32.1 12.3 4.6 9.8 4.8 7.7 26.9 29.1 5.2 3.0 
LR3 14.0 7.5 5.6 6.0 9.1 28.2 12.3 4.0 9.6 4.1 6.7 26.0 27.7 2.2 0.5 
HFO & Scrubber at 400 US$/t 
MR 14.7 17.5 9.6 16.3 18.9 62.3 12.7 8.8 14.5 11.9 14.1 49.3 55.0 13.0 7.3 
LR1 14.6 11.8 7.0 10.2 13.7 42.7 12.6 6.0 10.1 7.3 10.2 33.6 36.9 9.1 5.8 
LR2 14.1 8.8 6.2 6.8 10.9 32.7 12.4 4.6 9.8 4.8 8.0 27.2 29.4 5.5 3.3 
LR3 14.2 7.7 5.6 5.9 9.5 28.7 12.4 4.0 9.6 4.1 7.0 26.3 28.0 2.4 0.7 
MGO = 600 US$/t 
MR 12.5 19.8 9.6 19.3 20.6 69.3 11.4 11.4 14.5 13.0 14.7 53.6 59.3 15.7 10.0 
LR1 12.3 13.5 7.0 12.0 15.1 47.6 11.4 7.8 10.1 7.9 10.7 36.5 39.8 11.1 7.8 
LR2 11.9 10.0 6.2 8.0 12.1 36.3 11.1 5.9 9.8 5.2 8.5 29.4 31.6 6.9 4.7 
LR3 12.0 8.7 5.6 7.0 10.6 31.9 11.2 5.2 9.6 4.5 7.5 28.4 30.1 3.5 1.8 
HFO = 400US$/t +100 US$/t CO2 Tax = 711.4 US$/t 
MR 12.2 21.2 9.6 19.7 22.9 73.4 11.2 12.3 14.5 13.1 16.0 55.9 61.6 17.5 11.8 
LR1 12.0 14.3 7.0 12.3 16.5 50.1 11.2 8.4 10.1 8.1 11.5 38.1 41.4 12.0 8.7 
LR2 11.6 10.7 6.2 8.2 13.2 38.3 11.0 6.4 9.8 5.3 9.1 30.6 32.8 7.7 5.5 
LR3 11.7 9.3 5.6 7.1 11.5 33.5 11.0 5.6 9.6 4.6 7.9 29.3 31.0 4.2 2.5 
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